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In settings where patents and intellectual property provide a strong regime of
appropriability, the race to be the ﬁrst ﬁrm to patent a product or a process is a central
feature of competition. In this context, we hypothesize that cooperative arrangements
that only gain access to external knowledge contribute less to heterogeneity between
ﬁrms and have a much weaker inﬂuence on patenting than alliances that transfer highly
ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge, residing in individual and social relationships. We also
hypothesize that cooperations between private ﬁrms and public organizations accelerate
the rate of patenting to a higher degree than cooperations among private ﬁrms. We
develop and test these ideas on the population of 839 US biotechnology ﬁrms between
1973 and 2003. We discuss the importance of our ﬁndings on the debate about the value
of knowledge access versus knowledge transfer in strategic alliances.
Introduction
In many businesses, intellectual property takes
the form of trade secrets and proprietary
information. In others, patents and copyrights
prevail. The extent to which ﬁrms pursue
intellectual property in the form of patents
appears to be a function of the ‘regime of
appropriability’ – the extent to which ﬁrms can
appropriate future income streams and thus
cover the cost of innovation and still make a
proﬁt (Teece, 1987). The ability of biotechnology
ﬁrms to patent speciﬁc molecules and life forms
ensures a strong regime of appropriability for
most biotechnology ﬁrms (Gassmann, Reep-
meyer and Zedtwitz, 2008; Pisano, 2006a,
2006b). In this competitive context, the race to
patent innovations becomes a crucial aspect of
competitive strategy (Amburgey, Dacin and
Singh, 1996; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Re-
inganum, 1984).
It is well known that alliances are an important
source of knowledge that is essential in this race
for patents and knowledge (see for instance
Powell, 1987; Powell et al., 2005). However,
previous work on strategic alliances in biotech-
nology industries, including research in the area
of organizational learning, has treated all strate-
gic alliances as equivalent (see for example
DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Powell et al., 2005).
Recent advances in the alliance literature (e.g.
Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004) suggest that
researchers should make a distinction between
knowledge access and knowledge transfer.
Hitherto this idea has not been speciﬁcally tested;
so we take the opportunity to address gaps in the
biotechnology alliance literature and provide
some empirical exploration of the proposition
that accessing knowledge has diﬀering results
from transferring and integrating knowledge via
alliances. We also take the opportunity to
distinguish between diﬀerent types of partners,
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noting the important diﬀerence between institu-
tional types of knowledge providers: public
(including non-proﬁt) and private (see for exam-
ple Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000). With
regard to the type of cooperation we distinguish
between joint research alliances and licensing
agreements, and test their eﬀects on a ﬁrm’s
innovative outcome.
To our knowledge prior research has not
addressed central questions regarding the rela-
tionships between research alliances, licensing
agreements and organizational innovativeness.
Recent work points to the fact that the categor-
ization between knowledge ‘accessing’ and ‘learn-
ing’ arrangements might not be as sharp and
easily drawn as commonly assumed. For exam-
ple, some recent studies in the biotechnology
sector indicate that a serious amount of knowl-
edge is shared in license agreements in order to
advance development (Nightingale and Mahdi,
2006; Pisano, 2006a). Furthermore, recent studies
addressing the issue of ambidexterity in coopera-
tions between biotechnology ﬁrms and pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms indicate that to some extent
exploration takes part in all relationships be-
tween the partners, independently from the
Windrum, 2008; Gassmann and Keupp, 2007).
Hence, we believe that questions regarding the
contingencies and causalities driving knowledge
exploration versus exploitation have not received
suﬃcient attention in research so far and that we
address an important gap by analysing these
issues on the template of cooperation versus
licensing.
We also address a gap regarding characteristics
of diﬀerent alliance partner types on the outcome
of the cooperation. We are especially interested in
the trustworthiness of public versus private alliance
partners, e.g. pharmaceutical and biochemical
ﬁrms versus public universities and research
institutes. We assume that private ﬁrms are less
trustworthy than public organizations, which will
inﬂuence the outcome of the cooperation.
In the ﬁrst section of the paper we provide an
overview of the mechanisms by which organiza-
tions access knowledge and transform it into
intellectual property. We then develop three
hypotheses linking diﬀerent types of cooperation
to the rate at which biotechnology ﬁrms acquire
patents. The second half of the paper provides a
description of the data and methods used to test
our hypotheses, and a presentation and discus-
sion of our results. We end the paper with a brief
discussion of implications for our understanding
of knowledge access versus knowledge transfer
and the role of cooperations in generating patents
that often lead to competitive advantage.
Theory
Innovation and the knowledge-based view in
strategic management
Theories in strategic management are concerned
with explaining and predicting the sources of
economic rents for ﬁrms. Recently, there has
been a stream of research extending the resource-
based theory of the ﬁrm to constitute a knowl-
edge-based perspective (Sanchez and Heene,
1997; Spender, 1996; Spender and Grant, 1996;
Zack, 1999). The emerging knowledge-based view
focuses upon knowledge as the strategically most
important resource of the ﬁrm and devotes itself
to the role speciﬁc knowledge plays in the
development of competitive advantages. Accord-
ing to this theory, heterogeneous knowledge
bases are the main determinants of performance
diﬀerences (Spender, 1996; Spender and Grant,
1996).
Similarly, the study of innovation has tradi-
tionally conceptualized the innovation process as
the accumulation and recombination of knowl-
edge embodied in science and technology (Ka-
mien and Schwartz, 1982; Rosenberg, 1976;
Schumpeter, 1939). Even if there is little agree-
ment on what it means to be innovative,
economists and organization theorists both agree
on the fact that the only way for an organization
to sustain innovation is by constantly upgrading
its knowledge base (Acs and Audretsch, 1990;
Danielle, 2003; Dosi et al., 1988; Iansiti, 1998;
Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Spender, 1996). This
leads to a challenge for ﬁrms to acquire new
knowledge outside their boundaries and to build
up internal learning capabilities for integrating,
transforming and applying knowledge in innova-
tive products and services (Kogut and Zander,
1992, 1996).
Learning from alliances
Recent contributions on analysing cooperations
place an emphasis on knowledge- and learning-
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character of the linkage (e.g. Filiou and
related motives, arguing that cooperative strate-
gies are a major means of facilitating inter-
organizational learning and gaining access to
knowledge outside the ﬁrm’s boundaries (see for
example Badaracco, 1991; Grant and Baden-
Fuller, 1995; Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1998; von
Krogh and Roos, 1996; Lyles, 1994; Powell,
1987). Within that literature, a strong argument
is made that alliances have advantages over
contracts or markets, since drafting contracts
governing the sale or licensing of tacit knowledge
is diﬃcult due to the non-explicability of the
characteristics and performance of that knowl-
edge (Pisano, 1990).
Alliances are considered to be especially fruitful
for the development and transfer of tacit knowl-
edge, which forms the basis for a ﬁrm’s knowl-
edge-based advantage (Badaracco, 1991; Lyles et
al., 1996; Wathne, Roos and von Krogh, 1996).
Although the predominant emphasis in the
literature has been on examining learning-based
alliances, the theory and empirics have paid too
little attention to those alliances that only access
the knowledge of the partner. In the access
alliance, each member ﬁrm ‘accesses its partner’s
stock of knowledge in order to exploit comple-
mentarities, but with the intention of maintaining
its distinctive base of specialized knowledge’
(Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004, p. 64). This type
of alliance seems to be especially fruitful in
industries where products require a broad range
of diﬀerent knowledge types, resulting in the
rising cost of knowledge integration within one
single ﬁrm.
The distinction between learning versus acces-
sing knowledge in alliances is important because
it has consequences both for the interaction
within the alliance and for the outcome of the
alliance. Alliances that are aimed at accessing the
partner’s knowledge without learning it do not
necessarily require intensive interaction between
the partners; as a result the routines, procedures
and knowledge bases of partners remain diﬀer-
entiated from each other (Grant and Baden-
Fuller, 2004, p. 78). The alliance therefore
increases the knowledge specialization of part-
ners, whereas the partners’ knowledge bases in
learning alliances converge over time. There are
some limits to the outcome of knowledge-acces-
sing alliances. Prior research indicates that it
seems unlikely that the tacit components of
knowledge will be transferred given the limited
interaction between partners (Lyles et al., 1996;
Wathne, Roos and von Krogh, 1996). However,
we have to take into account that all knowledge
resides on a continuum, and that therefore a clear
distinction between tacit and explicit components
of knowledge might be diﬃcult. Thus, we do not
state that tacit knowledge will not be transferred
at all in these alliances, but we assume that only
small portions of the tacit components of knowl-
edge are accessible due to the limited interaction
between partners. We will emphasize this aspect
below. Furthermore, there will be limits to the
development of the integrative or architectural
capabilities (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and to
those capabilities required for the eﬀective inte-
gration of the acquired knowledge within their
own ﬁrm (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004, p. 79).
In contrast to accessing alliances, the learning
alliances explicitly aim at jointly developing,
transferring and integrating new knowledge,
thereby absorbing some of the partner’s valuable
and often tacit capabilities (Gambardella, 1995;
Gulati, 1995; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr,
1996). There are, however, some requirements for
the learning to take place (Crossan, Lane and
White, 1999; Inkpen and Crossan, 1995; Lyles
et al., 1996). Wathne, Roos and von Krogh
(1996) empirically observe several factors within
alliances contributing to the success of the
learning relationship. Alliances have to be con-
ceptualized as open learning arenas, where open-
ness can be measured by dialogue: being open is
measured by the degree to which the partners’
representatives work closely together on a com-
mon task and the degree to which the partners’
representatives perceive each other to share
rather than withhold or shield their knowledge.
Another factor inﬂuencing the transfer of tacit
knowledge is reﬂected in the characteristics of the
channel of interaction within alliances. Learning
alliances oﬀer the option of face-to-face interac-
tion, which is a rich medium because of its
capacity for immediate feedback and the avail-
ability of multiple, interactive cues.
Third, as a consequence of individual interac-
tion, trust and mutual understanding will develop
within learning alliances, contributing to knowl-
edge transfer eﬃciency (Kale, Singh and Perl-
mutter, 2000; Madhok, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily
and Perrone, 1998).
Finally, prior research has pointed to the fact
that learning might extend beyond the alliance
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itself. When a ﬁrm initiates a learning alliance it
begins a process of information exchange and
interaction that provides a forum for learning,
enabling both declarative and procedural knowl-
edge (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Kogut and
Zander, 1992, p. 387). The information ex-
changed typically involves declarative knowledge
of facts and propositions. However, ongoing
interaction between the partners also produces
procedural knowledge, the know-how gained in
managing the learning process itself. This experi-
ential learning leads to eﬃciency gains in
converting externally acquired knowledge to
internal routines. Firms can build competence
by integrating the components of their knowledge
base to develop new knowledge over time, a
process referred to as ‘architectural competence’
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), ‘integrative
capabilities’ (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), ‘com-
binative capabilities’ (Kogut and Zander, 1992),
‘higher-order capabilities’ (Sanchez and Heene,
1997) or ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece, Pisano
and Shuen, 1997). By interacting with an alliance,
partners’ ﬁrms might not only acquire new
knowledge but also improve their own learning
capabilities.
To sum up, we expect signiﬁcant diﬀerences
regarding the outcome of cooperation aimed at
learning from the partners versus cooperation
aimed at accessing the partner’s knowledge.
Although the distinction between accessing- and
learning-based alliances has been made concep-
tually (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hamel,
1991; Hennart, 1988; Mowery, Oxley and Silver-
man, 1996; Nakamura, Shaver and Yeung, 1990),
there are few empirical studies that have shed
light on the outcomes of these diﬀerent types of
alliances. Furthermore, no study we are aware of
has diﬀerentiated alliances by the type of partner
and the type of alliance itself. In the following
section we will discuss our empirical setting and
lay the foundation for our hypothesis.
Hypotheses development
Spectrum of cooperative linkages in the
biotechnology industry
Biotechnology is an organizational ﬁeld com-
posed of a wide variety of organizational forms
(Gassmann, Reepmeyer and Zedtwitz, 2008;
Hopkins et al., 2007; Pisano, 2006a). The ﬁeld
includes ﬁrms such as dedicated biotechnology,
traditional pharmaceutical and biochemical com-
panies. The ﬁeld also includes public organiza-
tions such as universities, governmental agencies
and research institutes. The true competence of
biotechnology ﬁrms is applied research devoted
to the exploitation of speciﬁc scientiﬁc discov-
eries, rather than basic research of the kind
conducted in public organizations or the engi-
neering capabilities and marketing system neces-
sary for large-scale production and distribution
found in traditional ﬁrms (Gambardella, 1995).
This disparity in competences and assets has led
to a division of labour between public organiza-
tions, biotechnology ﬁrms and traditional ﬁrms.
The complementary assets held by each type of
organization can then be consolidated through
inter-organizational relationships such as strate-
gic alliances (Gambardella, 1995, p. 147).
Strategic alliances within the ﬁeld of biotech-
nology have taken a number of diﬀerent forms
including collaborative R&D, licensing agree-
ments and marketing or distribution agreements.
We focus our attention on collaborative research
agreements and licensing agreements because the
knowledge involved in these arrangements can,
potentially, lead to patentable intellectual prop-
erty for biotechnology ﬁrms. The knowledge
transfer that can occur through marketing and/
or distribution agreements may be valuable but is
not amenable to patenting. Although biotechnol-
ogy ﬁrms may learn how to distribute products
more eﬀectively in a market or how to set
royalties eﬃciently, this is not knowledge which
is patentable.
Furthermore, we do not restrict our focus on
biotechnology research leading to drug develop-
ment. Our interest is broader and covers the
entire US biotechnology population. While we
include drug developments as well as other areas
of medicinal biotechnology such as diagnostics
we explore alliances covering the development of
non-medical applications as well.
The relevance of patents in biotechnology
In this study we link the outcome of a ﬁrm’s
cooperations to its patent productivity. Patents
are a critical measure of inventive output for
ﬁrms especially in knowledge intensive industries
(Ahuja, 2000; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; DeC-
arolis and Deeds, 1999; Rosenkopf and Nerkar,
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2001; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). Whereas there
seems to be no or only small eﬀects of patents for
securing the returns to innovation in industries
such as manufacturing, semiconductor or com-
munication equipment, patents are featured in
drugs and medical equipment industries, phar-
maceuticals and biotechnology (Cohen, 2005;
Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Hall, 2003). In
the biotechnology industry patents can be con-
sidered not only as an indicator of a ﬁrm’s
innovative success but also as a reasonable
measure of a ﬁrm’s innovative capabilities (e.g.
DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Lerner, 1994; Po-
well, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Patents are
formalized, codiﬁed and explicit manifestations
of innovative ideas, products or processes and
embody a ﬁrm’s technological and innovative
knowledge. Even more so, patents granted
represent successful outcomes of a highly un-
certain R&D process (Kamien and Schwartz,
1982). If a biotechnology ﬁrm has a history of
patenting it has a foundation of (protected)
technical knowledge which can enhance the rate
of further innovation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989;
Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000). More-
over, a history of patenting indicates that the ﬁrm
has acquired procedural knowledge – it has
learned how to innovate more eﬃciently (Powell,
Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996).
In the biotechnology industry patents addi-
tionally ensure a high regime of appropriability
for a biotechnology ﬁrm. In a recent cross-
industry survey Blind et al. (2006) explored the
signiﬁcance of various protection mechanisms
and the motives of patenting. Among ﬁrms in all
industries biotechnology ﬁrms were attaching the
greatest importance to patent strategies. With
regard to the motives of patenting the ﬁrst
priority was given to the classical knowledge
protection motive, to strengthen the incentives
for private R&D expenditures. Aside from the
knowledge protection motive patents are consid-
ered as an important source of revenues for
biotechnology ﬁrms and provide valuable signals
to the capital market and potential investors
(Blind et al., 2006, p. 664). Biotechnology ﬁrms
generate a large portion of their revenues from
selling their patented innovations to the pharma-
ceutical industry, predominantly in the form of
out-licensing (Gassmann and Keupp, 2007;
Gassmann et al., 2008, p. 35; Pisano, 2006a,
2006b). Thus, in this competitive context, the race
to patent innovations becomes a crucial aspect of
competitive strategy (Amburgey, Dacin and
Singh, 1996).
Characteristics of alliance form and partner type
We build our hypothesis by distinguishing
between the form of the alliance and the type of
the partners. Our ﬁrst distinction concentrates on
the form of alliance. We focus our attention on
two quite distinct forms of alliance, which
represent the knowledge-accessing versus knowl-
edge-learning dichotomy that we have discussed
earlier, namely collaborative research agreements
and licensing agreements. These two forms of
alliance diﬀer with regard to the level of
interaction. Both research and licensing agree-
ments involve contracting, but joint research
necessarily involves interaction between the
partners while licensing agreements do not. As
a consequence, the type of knowledge that can be
transferred between partners varies.
Our ﬁrst two hypotheses focus upon the
diﬀerences in the level of interaction in the
diﬀerent types of alliances and the type of
knowledge that can be transferred. Licensing
agreements are low-interaction relationships;
they are a typical example of a knowledge-
accessing alliance and so the biotechnology ﬁrm
has a partner that does not participate in the
creation of the knowledge. As a consequence the
core competences and assets of the biotechnology
ﬁrm are not involved in the alliance. Pisano
(2006a) has demonstrated that in biotechnology
these licensing agreements are typical arm’s
length contractual arrangements. ‘Under the
arm’s length agreements, there is very little
organizational, legal, ﬁnancial, or operational
integration. . . . Short term R&D contracts,
licensing agreements, and fee-for-service agree-
ments typically take this form’ (Pisano, 2006a,
p. 108). Licensing agreements between research
institutes, pharmaceutical ﬁrms and biotechnol-
ogy ﬁrms are an increasingly common strategy in
the biotechnology industry. With regard to
agreements between pharmaceutical ﬁrms and
biotechnology ﬁrms Gassmann et al. (2008, p. 86)
observe that out-licensing by pharmaceutical
ﬁrms (therefore in-licensing for the biotechnology
ﬁrm) has experienced remarkable growth over the
last years. More and more pharmaceutical ﬁrms
start to license out know-how (e.g. early stage
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substances or compounds) of their research
department for cost and eﬃciency reasons, there-
by creating chances for biotechnology ﬁrms to
further develop and integrate the acquired
technological know-how with their own research
expertise. Often the pharmaceutical company
retains a call-back option to license the substance
back at later stages of development (Gassmann,
Reepmeyer and Zedtwitz, 2008, p. 142).
While some transfer of knowledge will take
place in licensing relationships, the explicit
learning of the partner’s skills and capabilities is
not at the core of the agreement. Alternatively,
with collaborative research alliances, both part-
ners are involved in the performance of the
activity. This type of relationship oﬀers the
opportunity to utilize not only the codiﬁed
knowledge held by the participants but also the
tacit knowledge, procedures and routines in-
volved in the creation of new knowledge (Gass-
mann, Reepmeyer and Zedtwitz, 2008, p. 70). We
expect the alliance experience a ﬁrm has to
enhance its likelihood of successful innovation
in two ways. First, we expect the combinative
capabilities of the ﬁrm to be developed over time
as ﬁrms show a history of partnering in research
(Kogut and Zander, 1992). Second, biotechnol-
ogy ﬁrms with a history of external collaboration
will have a better developed internal competence
in integrating a wide range of disciplinary
knowledge (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994),
will have developed greater architectural compe-
tence and will therefore have greater success in
converting current knowledge into new knowl-
edge. We therefore expect collaborative research
alliances in general to enhance the research
capabilities of a biotechnology ﬁrm and to show
a positive inﬂuence on their patent rate. How-
ever, we need to have a close look at the diﬀerent
kinds of partners, as the eﬀectiveness of knowl-
edge transfer could also be inﬂuenced by the
partner as well as the type of knowledge transfer
arrangement.
Our second distinction therefore diﬀerentiates
between alliances in the biotechnology industry
by the type of partners involved with the
biotechnology ﬁrm: public research organizations
or private ﬁrms. These diﬀerent types of potential
partners vary substantially in their scientiﬁc
foundations and dominant logics (Powell, Koput
and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Powell et al., 2005). The
scientiﬁc knowledge base of biotechnology ﬁrms
is close to that of public research organizations
(e.g. both conduct research in the area of
molecular biology). Although biotechnology
ﬁrms share enough scientiﬁc knowledge with
public research organizations to eﬀectively learn
and transfer knowledge, they show a great
dissimilarity with regard to their operational
knowledge. This is due to their dissimilar
dominant logic. Public organizations engaged in
basic research are oriented towards the produc-
tion of knowledge rather than towards the
conversion of scientiﬁc knowledge into commer-
cial products. Although some public research
organizations strive for the commercialization of
their research results (i.e. transfer agencies of
universities) we do not consider them ‘rent
seeking’, as their primary and only purpose is
not to generate rents.
A diﬀerent picture emerges when we look at
the second type of partner. The scientiﬁc knowl-
edge of biotechnology ﬁrms and pharmaceutical
or chemical ﬁrms is dissimilar (e.g. molecular
biology versus biochemistry). However, the
operational knowledge base of biotechnology
ﬁrms is closer to that of traditional pharmaceu-
tical ﬁrms than to that of public research
organizations. This is due to the fact that, as
entities seeking economic rents, biotechnology
ﬁrms and traditional pharmaceutical ﬁrms have
similar dominant logics, both striving for the
conversion of scientiﬁc knowledge into commer-
cial products (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; Powell,
Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996).
These distinctions are important for the degree
of knowledge that can be transferred within the
alliance. Lane and Lubatkin (1998), extending
and reﬁning the ﬁrm-level concept of absorptive
capacity to a dyadic level, argue that the amount
of knowledge transfer is largely determined by
the relative relationship between the knowledge
bases of partners. They therefore expect the
similarity in the knowledge bases of partners to
inﬂuence the amount of knowledge transfer.
Organizations will have the greatest potential to
learn from organizations with similar basic
knowledge but diﬀerent specialized knowledge
(relative absorptive capacity).
With regard to the biotechnology industry,
basic knowledge is reﬂected in the scientiﬁc
knowledge bases of the organizations, while
specialized knowledge is reﬂected in the opera-
tional knowledge bases of the organizations.
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Dedicated biotechnology ﬁrms therefore share a
similar basic knowledge with public research
organizations (disciplinary foundations) but dif-
fer in terms of their specialized knowledge
(commercialization versus basic research). Alter-
natively, dedicated biotechnology ﬁrms and
traditional pharmaceutical or chemical ﬁrms
share specialized knowledge but diﬀer with
regard to their basic knowledge base (Gassmann,
Reepmeyer and Zedtwitz, 2008; Hopkins et al.,
2007; Nightingale, 2000; Pisano, 2006b). As a
consequence, we would expect alliances with
diﬀerent types of partners to exhibit diﬀerent
levels of relative absorptive capacity.
To summarize, alliances within the biotechnol-
ogy ﬁeld can be classiﬁed along two dimensions.
The ﬁrst dimension is the level of interaction
between partners and, consequently, the type of
knowledge transferred within the relationship
(tacit versus codiﬁed). The second dimension is
the type of partner and, consequently, the relative
absorptive capacity of the relationship. We
distinguish between the following four forms of
alliances in the organizational ﬁeld of biotechnol-
ogy (cf. Figure 1).
Our hypotheses look to explain the diﬀering
levels of performance between the cells shown in
Figure 1. Essentially, we argue that access
alliances are less productive in terms of facilitat-
ing basic research than collaborative agreements
that involve transfer of knowledge. (That is, cells
I and II are less productive than cells III and IV.)
But we are careful to ensure that we compare like
for like. Our ﬁrst hypothesis thus concentrates on
the eﬀects of knowledge-accessing versus knowl-
edge-learning alliances with public organizations
(i.e. universities) on the innovative outcome of
biotechnology ﬁrms. Our second hypothesis
addresses the eﬀects of alliances with ﬁrms (such
as pharmaceutical ﬁrms). Both hypotheses thus
distinguish between the type of partner and the
type of cooperative agreement.
H1: The eﬀect on the patent rate of prior
research alliances with public organizations is
greater than the eﬀect on the patent rate of
prior licensing agreements with public organi-
zations.
H2: The eﬀect on the patent rate of prior
research alliances with ﬁrms is greater than the
eﬀect on the patent rate of prior licensing
agreements with ﬁrms.
Our third hypothesis speciﬁcally incorporates the
type of partner. We argued above that relation-
ships with public organizations should produce
higher relative absorptive capacity for biotech-
nology ﬁrms than relationships with pharmaceu-
tical or chemical ﬁrms. This alone suggests that
collaborative research with public organizations
should enhance research productivity more than
collaborative research with other ﬁrms. In addi-
tion, we propose that the diﬀerence in dominant
logics between public organizations and ﬁrms will
inﬂuence the quality of the interactions between
partners and will inﬂuence the amount of trust
between partners. Wathne, Roos and von Krogh
(1996) argue that the overall perceived openness
Figure 1. Types of alliances in the biotechnology industry
Note: Hypothesis 1 compares cells I and III; Hypothesis 2 compares cells II and IV; Hypothesis 3 compares cells III and IV.
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of dialogue and the degree to which the partner
representatives perceive that the others withhold
or shield their knowledge aﬀects knowledge
transfer. Other research has shown that trust
contributes to greater knowledge exchange be-
tween alliance partners (e.g. Kale, Singh and
Perlmutter, 2000) and has positive eﬀects on the
eﬃciency of a research alliance because it
facilitates the learning process and the transfer
of knowledge itself (Madhok, 1995).
Relationships with ﬁrms involve a risk of
knowledge appropriation and the loss of valuable
intellectual property: indeed much of the aca-
demic and managerial literature on organiza-
tional learning is devoted to discussion of the
need to protect intellectual property when enga-
ging in strategic alliances (Liebeskind, 1996).
Turning to the relationship between biotechnol-
ogy and pharmaceutical ﬁrms several aspects
need to be considered. As entities seeking
economic rents, biotechnology and pharmaceu-
tical ﬁrms have similar dominant logics, both
seeking the conversion of scientiﬁc knowledge
into commercial products (see Pisano, 2006a;
Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006; Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004). Their similar dominant logic
does not inhibit the evolution of trust between
pharmaceutical and biochemical ﬁrms. However,
it makes pharmaceutical ﬁrms less trustworthy
partners than public organizations (Hoang and
Rothaermel, 2005). This might explain why
recent large-scale studies have observed an
increase in the amount of explicitly formalized
(e.g. contractual) research relationships between
biotechnology and pharmaceutical ﬁrms (see
Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006; Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004).
On the other side, public organizations are not
rent-seeking organizations and are therefore
more oriented towards the production of basic
discovery than the conversion of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge into commercial products. While this may
not make public sector partners more trust-
worthy within their own sector, such diﬀerences
in the uses of the knowledge created in an alliance
are likely to make them trustworthy partners for
biotechnology ﬁrms (Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996). Even in those rare cases where
public organizations such as universities are
‘revenue-oriented’ (i.e. seeking to generate re-
search funding from public sources or on some
occasions generating revenues from out-licensing
patented innovation through their ‘transfer in-
stitutes’), we do not consider them ‘rent-seeking’,
as their primary and only purpose is not to
generate rents. Public organizations have charters
that are aiming at public goods and public goals
(set by governments); there are no shareholders in
these organizations. This does not restrict them
from generating ﬁnancial revenues, but it is not
their primary goal.
Summing up, we propose that relationships
with public organizations will involve a greater
perceived openness of dialogue and less of a
perception that the partner is withholding or
shielding knowledge. We therefore expect re-
search alliances with public organizations (e.g.
universities) to show a higher inﬂuence on the
patent rate than research alliances between
pharmaceutical and biochemical ﬁrms. Our third
hypothesis therefore compares cell III with cell
IV in Figure 1.
H3: The eﬀect on the patent rate of prior
research alliances with public organizations will
be greater than the eﬀect on the patent rate of
prior research alliances with ﬁrms.
Data and methods
Data
The longitudinal data set used in the study
consists of the complete US population of 839
biotechnology ﬁrms founded during the period
1973–1999. The signiﬁcance of the beginning date
was the major Cohen–Boyer breakthrough in
1973. We used two primary sources to compile
the sample. The ﬁrst was the BIOSCAN database
published by Oryx Press. The second source was
the US Companies Database compiled by the
North Carolina Biotechnology Center (now Bio-
world). We purged the consolidated list of
companies of all ﬁrms which were founded before
1973, which were not US ﬁrms or which were
non-independent entities (subsidiaries, divisions
and joint ventures) to arrive at 839 companies.
These data and other sources were used to
construct an event history for each company.
Event histories are data structures that include
information on the number, timing and sequence
of the events that are being examined. Each ﬁrm’s
history began at the time of its incorporation or
qualiﬁcation to do business and ended at the time
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of an event or at the end of the month, whichever
came ﬁrst. The organization’s second spell started
on the following day and ended at the time of an
event or the end of the month. This pattern
continued until the ﬁrm exited (through failure or
acquisition) or until the end of the observation
period, in which case spells were coded as ‘right
censored’. This procedure allowed time-varying
covariates to be updated throughout the ﬁrm’s
history at monthly intervals.
A wide variety of sources were used to augment
the information in our two primary sources. We
examined the legal archives on the LexisNexis
service to obtain exact dates of incorporation or
qualiﬁcation to do business. A search of the news
archives on LexisNexis (including specialized
outlets such as Biotechnology News Watch) was
used to identify dates of events. Similarly, the
online archives of Recombinant Capital provided
supplemental information on strategic alliances.
Information from the US Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce was the primary source for the assignment
of patents. In those cases where only the month
and year of an alliance could be determined, the
day was set at the midpoint of the month to
minimize errors in timing.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the patent rate l(t).
The rate is deﬁned as
lðtÞ ¼ lim½qðt; tþ DtÞ=Dt Dt! 0
where q is the discrete probability of the ﬁrm
ﬁling a patent between t and t1Dt, conditional on
the history of the process up to time t. This rate
summarizes the information on the intervals of
time between successive events, with higher
values of the rate corresponding to shorter times
between events (higher patenting speed) and vice
versa. In using patent data we follow the research
eﬀorts of several other scholars who have used
patents as a measure of innovative success of
ﬁrms (Albert et al., 1991; Dutta and Weiss, 1997;
Engelsman and van Raan, 1994; Henderson and
Cockburn, 1994; Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg and Hender-
son, 1993; Narin, Noma and Perry, 1987;
Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). We have to
acknowledge that there are a number of potential
limitations of using patent data. First, patents are
a partial measure of the production of organiza-
tion knowledge: they may capture codiﬁed
knowledge ﬂows but not tacit knowledge (such
as that embedded in organizational routines).
Our study therefore captures innovation and
knowledge exchanges of articulated technological
knowledge. However, empirical ﬁndings suggest
that codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows (represented by
patents) and tacit knowledge ﬂows are closely
linked and complementary (Mowery, Oxley and
Silverman, 1996).
Another potential drawback in the use of
patent data is that patenting is itself a strategic
choice and hence all technological innovations
may not be patented. However, the nature of
competition in the biotechnology industry en-
courages fast patenting of innovations. Patents
form the intellectual capital of this industry (Shan
and Song, 1997). In this context, the race to
patent innovations becomes a crucial aspect of
competitive strategy: given that patents are
granted to the ﬁrst to invent the idea, running
second provides little beneﬁt.
We also want to emphasize that our data set
consists of the entire US biotechnology popula-
tion. This means that while we include drug
developments as well as other areas of medicinal
biotechnology such as diagnostics, we explore
non-medical applications such as the develop-
ment of platform technologies and tools as well.
This has the consequence that our data compre-
hends patented innovations that do not involve
the development of a new chemical entity (NCE).
Thus, we are not concerned with innovation in
terms of approval of new chemicals, but we are
looking at the broader ﬁeld of innovation in
general.
Independent variables
Our primary independent variables are cumula-
tive counts of prior research and in-licensing
agreements between US biotechnology ﬁrms and
US or non-US partners. We code the initiation
date of the agreements, but we do not measure
the duration of these agreements. Given our data
structure, unfortunately, we do not have infor-
mation on the termination dates of research
alliances and licensing agreements to generate
time spells of agreement durations. All agree-
ments in the database were coded to include
information on the type of the agreement and
on the type of partner. For this paper we
distinguished two types of agreements, research
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alliances and in-licensing agreements. We then
constructed the cumulative count of prior re-
search alliances with public organizations en-
gaged in basic research (universities and research
institutes) and with pharmaceutical or biochem-
ical ﬁrms. Similarly, we constructed the cumula-
tive number of prior in-licensing agreements with
public organizations engaged in basic research
and with pharmaceutical or biochemical ﬁrms.
We did not treat public and private universities
separately, but included both types of universities
in the data analysis. The reason for treating them
equally is that they do not diﬀer fundamentally in
aspects decisive for our research question.
Whether public or private, they are both uni-
versities and therefore institutions with public
goals and public charters and similar constraints.
With regard to the licensing agreements we focus
on in-licensing, a strategy where a biotechnology
ﬁrm signs a contract with a third party to gain
access to usage rights for technological know-
how. From our own experience in biotechnology
and from other research we know that in-
licensing agreements are typical ‘arm’s length’
relationships where mutual learning is not
intended.
Control variables
Two types of control variables were used in the
analysis: attributes of the environment and
attributes of individual ﬁrms. Although the bulk
of strategic management theory emphasizes the
primacy of strategic choice, much of the recent
work on innovation has emphasized the impor-
tance of organizational context. In this paper, we
examine the impact of organizational attributes
and choices on the rate at which biotechnology
ﬁrms acquire patents, while attempting to control
for the eﬀects of context.
Population level controls
Contextual variables included population den-
sity, corporate patents granted and counts of
alliances by other ﬁrms.
Population density. In many instances, the
number of ﬁrms has been found to be positively
related to the rate of innovation and patenting
(Reinganum, 1984; Sah and Stiglitz, 1987). The
argument is that a larger number of competitors
increases the intensity of rivalry in such a way
that ﬁrms accelerate their development pro-
grammes. Population density was deﬁned as the
total number of biotechnology ﬁrms in existence
at the beginning of a calendar year. The density
variable was adjusted to reﬂect the disappearance
of ﬁrms through failure, acquisition or merger.
Total corporate patents granted in the popula-
tion. The annual number of all corporate
patents granted in the population was used to
measure cumulative patent activity in the bio-
technology population. We followed the classiﬁ-
cation of the US Patent and Trademark Oﬃce
and included all biotechnology patents (predo-
minantly US patent classes 424 and 514).
Total number of alliances in the population. Ann-
ual counts of strategic alliances among all
biotechnology ﬁrms in the population were used
to capture competitive rivalry produced by
cooperative strategies. These counts were adjusted
for each ﬁrm to remove their alliances and
patents.
Firm level controls
The second set of control variables measured
attributes of the ﬁrms themselves. Much of the
decision and game theoretic work in economics
assumes that ﬁrms are identical, engage in one
project at a time, and do not transfer knowledge
from one patent race to the next (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1982, pp. 189–193). Even the most
cursory examination of biotechnology questions
the validity of these assumptions. We do not
assume identical ﬁrms: our primary interest is
precisely in the ways in which ﬁrms vary in their
ability to acquire intellectual property. However,
not all diﬀerences between ﬁrms are central to
our analyses, some being merely potential con-
founds.
Firm age. The ﬁrst variable was ﬁrm age,
measured as the number of days since the
founding or qualiﬁcation of the ﬁrm.
Prior patents. The second was the cumulative
number of prior patents of the ﬁrm. This variable
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was updated whenever a patent was granted.
Kamien and Schwartz (1982) assert that the eﬀect
of technical uncertainty in the R&D process is to
make the eﬀort required for successful comple-
tion an unknown. In this situation, successful
innovation and the time of its occurrence are
probabilistic. However, they argue that the
probability of successful completion at any time
is an increasing function of cumulative eﬀort at
that time. Cumulative eﬀort may increase the
probability of successful innovation but an
accumulation of successful outcomes is even
more likely to do so. If a ﬁrm has a history of
successful patenting it will have a foundation of
(protected) technical knowledge which can en-
hance the rate of further innovation. Moreover, a
history of successful patenting indicates that the
ﬁrm has acquired procedural knowledge – it has
learned how to innovate more eﬃciently.
Absorptive capacity. The ability to recognize,
acquire and exploit new knowledge (i.e. the
concept of absorptive capacity) will inﬂuence a
biotechnology ﬁrm’s ability to convert knowledge
into patents. Our measure of absorptive capacity
was the number of research domains within
which the ﬁrm participated. Six research domains
were used to categorize the ﬁrms: diagnostics,
therapeutics, agricultural, veterinary, food/fer-
mentation and other. The BIOSCAN database
and information from the North Carolina Bio-
technology Center were used to classify each ﬁrm.
The number of research domains in which ﬁrms
were active was a simple count.
In conceptualizing the breadth of a ﬁrm’s
knowledge base as a proxy for its absorptive
capacity we follow prior research that has
conceptualized absorptive capacity as a knowl-
edge base – more speciﬁcally, as the extent of
prior knowledge in the ﬁrm (Ahuja and Katila,
2001; Kim, 1998; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman,
1996) – and utilized proxies such as R&D
intensity (Meeus, Oerlemans and Hage, 2001;
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Tsai, 2001)
and patents (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Mowery,
Oxley and Silverman, 1996). We reﬁne that
approach by linking characteristics of a ﬁrm’s
knowledge base to the concept of absorptive
capacity. Especially the breadth and complexity of
a biotechnology ﬁrm’s scientiﬁc knowledge base –
as reﬂected in the number of diﬀerent research
domains it is active in – serves as our indicator of
absorptive capacity (see similar Galunic and
Rodan, 1998; Van den Bosch, Volberda and De
Boer, 1999). In other studies absorptive capacity
has been related to the scope of a ﬁrm’s knowl-
edge base, such as the breadth of its product-
market knowledge or the breadth of its capabil-
ities in general (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Barkema
and Vermeulen, 1998; Isobe, Makino and Mon-
tgomery, 2000; Kim and Kogut, 1996). Further-
more, our concept of absorptive capacity is also
linked to organizational learning (Autio, Sapienza
and Almeida, 2000; Barkema and Vermeulen,
1998). Especially with regard to knowledge and
innovation intensive ﬁrms innovation is best
supported by an absorptive capacity based on a
broad range of loosely related knowledge
domains that help to further increase that breadth
(Van den Bosch, Volberda and De Boer, 1999).
Access to ﬁnancial resources. The remaining
ﬁrm-level control variables are the public/private
status of the ﬁrm and the cumulative number of
prior private placements of equity, two indicators
of access to ﬁnancial capital. Many scholars of
innovation have argued that R&D is diﬃcult to
ﬁnance externally, yet R&D can require sub-
stantial capital. One implication of a ﬁnancing
constraint is that ﬁrms with greater access to
capital can engage in research at a greater pace.
Model
Since the occurrence of patents over time for a ﬁrm
represents a series of repeated events, event history
analysis is a very useful analytic technique. The
event series was modelled as a stochastic point
process (Amburgey, 1986). The patent rate l(t) was
speciﬁed as an exponential function of the indepen-
dent variables and a set of parameters capturing the
eﬀects of the variables on the patenting rate, such as
lðtÞ ¼ expðbXtÞ
The use of an exponential baseline model such as
this is common in event history analyses. Since we
included the age of the ﬁrm as an explicitly
measured covariate we did not use a Weibull
speciﬁcation to add a second model parameter for
monotonic time dependence. Parameters were
estimated using maximum likelihood with the
STATA program. The estimation procedure clus-
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tered observations by ﬁrms to reduce the impact of
unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects (White, 1982). The
signiﬁcance levels of the parameters were evaluated
by examination of t-ratios, whereas the goodness-
of-ﬁt of the diﬀerent models compared to the
constant term only model was evaluated by
examination of Wald statistics. The Wald statistics
describe the improvement in ﬁt between hierarchi-
cally nested models and follow a chi-squared
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the
diﬀerence in the number of parameters of the two
models. We used two models to evaluate our
hypotheses. The ﬁrst model included only control
variables and constitutes a baseline model. The
second model included the control variables and
the primary variables. This model was used to
evaluate the hypotheses. In comparing the full
model with the model that only contains the
control variables, we used the likelihood ratio
statistic. Our use of the robust variance estimator
(clustering multiple observations of the same ﬁrm)
potentially invalidates the use of the likelihood
ratio test, so some caution should be used in the
comparison of these two nested models.
Results
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations
for the variables in our models as well as a
correlation matrix. All of the variables used in the
model have moderate inter-correlations except
the number of ﬁrms and the total number of
strategic alliances, which are highly correlated.
Given the large number of patents, multicolli-
nearity among covariates does not seem to be a
problem. Table 2 provides the results of our
event-history analysis. Model 1 provides para-
meter estimates for the control variables only,
while Model 2 provides parameter estimates for
control variables and the independent variables
used to test our hypotheses. The parameter
estimates in Model 1 indicate that all of the
control variables, except the number of ﬁrms and
prior private placements of equity, have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the rate at which biotechnol-
ogy ﬁrms generate patents. Of the six control
variables with signiﬁcant eﬀects, ﬁve of the
variables accelerate the patent rate; only the total
number of alliances in the population depresses
the patent rate. The likelihood ratio test for
Model 1 indicates that it is a signiﬁcant improve-
ment over the random-eﬀects baseline model.
The parameter estimates provided in Model 2
indicate that the control variables continue to
exhibit a similar pattern although some eﬀects are
attenuated and the number of research domains
no longer aﬀects the patent rate. Of the four
variables of interest, one has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the patent rate and two have a marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀect. The number of prior licensing
agreements with public organizations engaged
in basic research does not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the patent rate. The number of prior
licensing agreements with pharmaceutical or
biochemical ﬁrms has a negative eﬀect on the
patent rate, although the parameter estimate is
only signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level. The estimate for
the eﬀect of prior research alliances with public
organizations engaged in basic research is posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant. The estimate for
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Number of ﬁrms 480.1 150.5 0.93 0.70 0.42 0.20 0.21 0.17  0.05 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.10
2. Total strategic alliances 346.2 149.8 0.71 0.39 0.19 0.21 0.17  0.05 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.10
3. Total corporate patents 184.3 135.2 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.14  0.05 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.06
4. Age 2190.5 1583.9 0.24 0.25 0.34 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.13
5. Public ﬁrm 0.2258 0.4181 0.52 0.34 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.22 0.22
6. Prior private placements 0.7274 1.697 0.43 0.28 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.36
7. Prior patents 1.613 5.807 0.14 0.16 0.41 0.21 0.31
8. Number of research domains 1.949 1.006 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.11
9. Prior research alliances – public 0.2147 0.8816 0.25 0.27 0.19
10. Prior research alliances – ﬁrms 0.2334 1.174 0.18 0.45
11. Prior patent licences – public 0.1152 0.5828 0.22
12. Prior patent licences – ﬁrms 0.0757 0.4985
All correlations signiﬁcant at po0.05. Based on 95,342 spells.
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the eﬀect of prior research alliances with phar-
maceutical or biochemical ﬁrms is positive but
only statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
We evaluate our hypotheses by comparing
the parameter estimates of diﬀerent variables. We
do this by conducting a diﬀerence-of-means test
for the relevant coeﬃcients. In Hypothesis 1 we
proposed that the eﬀect of prior research
alliances with public organizations would have
a greater eﬀect on the patent rate than prior
licensing agreements. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from one another and the
diﬀerence is in the proposed direction, thus
providing support for Hypothesis 1. We made
an equivalent argument for research alliances and
licensing with pharmaceutical and chemical ﬁrms
in Hypothesis 2. Again, the coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another and the
diﬀerence is in the proposed direction, thus
providing support for Hypothesis 2. Finally,
Hypothesis 3 was that research alliances with
public organizations engaged in basic research
would have a greater eﬀect on the patent rate
than prior research alliances with pharmaceutical
or biochemical ﬁrms. The relevant coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other and in the
proposed direction, which provides support for
Hypothesis 3.
Discussion
Most experts agree that the acquisition of
intellectual property is an important component
of competitive strategy in innovative industries.
This research indicates that the strategic actions
of biotechnology ﬁrms have an important impact
on their ability to generate patentable intellectual
property. Our results clearly indicate that an
alliance that is aimed at purchasing codiﬁed
intellectual property (e.g. in-licensing patents) is
not, by itself, an eﬀective means of generating
new knowledge. First, the purchase of codiﬁed
knowledge is not likely to provide access to the
tacit knowledge required for successful integra-
tion with the ﬁrm’s current knowledge base; the
integration of the knowledge (development of
linkages) is therefore problematic (Grant and
Baden-Fuller, 2004). Second, since some portion
of the knowledge may be embedded in speciﬁc
routines within the selling organization, the
utilization of the acquired knowledge by the
buying ﬁrm may also require the transfer of
routines as well as the codiﬁed knowledge. These
organizational routines may be codiﬁed (and thus
not tacit knowledge) but will not accompany the
patent itself (Pisano, 1994, 2006a, 2006b). Ac-
quiring explicit knowledge therefore does not
contribute to the development of the internal
capabilities of the ﬁrm necessary to recombine
prior and new knowledge in a way that leads to
innovation (Kogut and Zander, 1996).
For knowledge that is to be accessed from
another private ﬁrm the motivation for the
purchase is often to ‘catch up’ with rivals and
try to overtake them. Here, there is considerable
danger that the rival is so far ahead that catch-up
is not possible. Our data conﬁrm this fact. The
inﬂuence from knowledge access alliances with
private ﬁrms on the patent rate is signiﬁcantly
negative. This suggests that accessing knowledge
and competences from external rival private
Table 2. The eﬀects of environmental and organizational variables
on the patent rate
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Number of ﬁrms 0.0002 0.000
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Total strategic alliances  0.002**  0.002**
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Total corporate patents 0.004** 0.004**
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Age 0.0001** 0.00009*
(0.00004) (0.00004)
Public ﬁrm 1.216** 1.169**
(0.167) (0.173)
Prior private placements 0.018 0.022
(0.020) (0.022)
Prior patents 0.050** 0.049**
(0.004) (0.005)
Number of research domains 0.101** 0.057
(0.036) (0.043)
Prior research alliances with public org. 0.083**
(0.039)
Prior research alliances with ﬁrms 0.036*
(0.020)
Prior licensing agreements with public org. 0.003
(0.037)
Prior licensing agreements with ﬁrms  0.053*
(0.031)
Number of events 2432 2432
Chi-squared 1277.73 1456.82
Degrees of freedom 8 12
p value po0.001 po0.001
**po0.05; *po0.10.
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sources will be largely a waste of eﬀort and may
even hinder or delay the development of the
internal innovative capabilities of the ﬁrm. The
strategic capabilities of the ﬁrm take time and
practice to be developed (Henderson, 1996, p.
370). Huber (1991) as well as Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) argue that ﬁrms not actively
applying knowledge stock do not receive the
necessary feedback to build up and develop their
capabilities over time (Dierickx and Cool, 1989,
p. 1508). Critical capabilities will not be devel-
oped when critical knowledge is sourced exter-
nally. We assume that licensing external
knowledge will not enhance a biotechnology
ﬁrm’s ability to generate new knowledge in the
form of patents.
From a more general point of view our ﬁndings
reconﬁrm the basic argument of the resource- and
knowledge-based theories of the ﬁrm that any
asset (including knowledge) that can be pur-
chased in a market is not likely to provide
sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1986,
1991). Our analyses strongly support this argu-
ment since prior licensing of patents does not
enhance patenting among biotechnology ﬁrms.
Only collaboration in the research process
provides access to the tacit knowledge which
can, potentially, provide an advantage.
This is not to say that purchased knowledge
plays no role at all, but merely that licensed
patents can act only as enabling knowledge. Take
for example the Cohen–Boyer patent for the use
of plasmids in recombining DNA. Any biotech-
nology ﬁrm involved in recombinant DNA had
to license the patent to operate; it was a necessary
or enabling condition. However, the purchase of
the patent rights would not be a suﬃcient
condition for the generation of new knowledge.
Of equal importance is our ﬁnding that
research collaboration does enhance the develop-
ment of patentable intellectual property.
Although the most substantial eﬀect in our
research is the public/private status of the ﬁrm,
research collaborations are an important way to
stimulate research output. The knowledge-based
view of the ﬁrm suggests that the acquisition of
tacit and procedural knowledge is an important
element in gaining competitive advantage. Re-
search collaborations provide a mechanism for
this type of knowledge transfer that is not
possible with arms’ length relationships such as
licensing. Our analysis therefore indicates that
research collaborations can provide competitive
advantage in patenting.
We argue that this is due to two eﬀects. The
ﬁrst eﬀect refers to the development of combina-
tive capabilities over time as ﬁrms show a history
of partnering, enhancing a ﬁrm’s ability to
combine externally developed knowledge with
existing internal knowledge to generate new
innovative outcomes. Additionally, biotechnol-
ogy ﬁrms with a history of external collaboration
will have developed architectural competence
more successfully to integrate a wide range of
knowledge components, e.g. knowledge in diﬀer-
ent scientiﬁc disciplines. Our ﬁndings are in line
with recent research indicating that external
collaboration helps biotechnology ﬁrms to build
internal capabilities for innovation (Grant and
Baden-Fuller, 2004; Owen-Smith and Powell,
2004; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).
Our research suggests, however, that not all
collaborative research is equally eﬀective. The
organizational learning literature suggests that
the combination of dissimilar, non-redundant
knowledge is more likely to generate innovation
(Dussauge, Garette and Mitchell, 2000). Our
analyses are supportive of this notion, and
highlight the importance of relative absorptive
capacity (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Much of the
prior work on absorptive capacity conceptualized
it as a characteristic of an organization. Our
research suggests that absorptive capacity is a
dyadic phenomenon.
This research extends prior research in several
ways. Much of the previous work on strategic
alliances in biotechnology industries, including
research in the area of organizational learning,
has treated all strategic alliances as equivalent
(see for example DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999).
Moreover, even research which has distinguished
between types of alliances has not distinguished
between types of partners (see for example
Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Our
research suggests that it is crucial not only to
distinguish between diﬀerent forms of alliance
when researching organizational learning but
also to distinguish between diﬀerent types of
partners (see for example Baum, Calabrese and
Silverman, 2000). Firms therefore have to make
deliberate decisions about which partner type to
add to their alliance portfolios.
In addition, our research contributes to the
distinction between knowledge-accessing and
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knowledge-learning alliances that has received
attention in recent research (e.g. Grant and
Baden-Fuller, 2004). Our ﬁndings shed light on
the consequences of engaging in alliances that aim
purely at accessing the knowledge of partners.
While these alliances might be useful in acquiring
valuable knowledge components (i.e. technologies),
they restrain ﬁrms from developing their own
innovative capabilities. Accessing knowledge from
external partners therefore shows consequences
that are quite distinct from jointly developing
knowledge and capabilities. This aspect has not
received suﬃcient attention in prior research on the
consequences of in-licensing of knowledge (Gass-
mann et al., 2008). Our ﬁndings clearly point to the
necessity of future research in this ﬁeld.
Finally, there are some implications for public
policy that can be deduced from our ﬁndings.
Our analysis suggests that the American ap-
proach of a pluralist and contextual technology
policy (Giesecke, 2000, p. 214) has been quite
successful in connecting new scientiﬁc knowledge
from research institutions to industrial demand
(Whittington, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2009).
The US public policy initiatives in biotechnology
to develop and support regional clusters around
universities have followed examples from other
innovation systems in for example Japan, the UK
or France (Kaiser and Prange, 2004; Lehrer and
Asakawa, 2004; Lo¨fsten and Lindelo¨f, 2002).
This approach seems to foster the development of
a functioning system of innovation at least
regarding the linkages of universities and high-
technology ﬁrms (such as biotechnology ﬁrms).
However, analysing the contingencies of network
linkages between public as well as private actors
with high-technology ﬁrms might be an impor-
tant area for future research.
Limitations and implications for
future research
Several limitations of this research should be taken
into account when interpreting our ﬁndings. While
our research sheds light on innovative processes in
the biotechnology industry in general, and their
results in terms of patents, we have to take into
consideration that a more reﬁned view of the
diﬀerent sectors in this industry might be promis-
ing. For example, we have to acknowledge that at
present there is an unclear picture regarding the
impact biotechnological research has for the
overall scientiﬁc development in health care (i.e.
approval of NCE). While some researchers raise
concerns regarding the merits of the so-called
‘biotech revolution’ in health care (see Hopkins et
al., 2007; Nightingale, 2000; Pisano, 2006a), we
believe in the future potential of this speciﬁc
industry segment. There seems to be a consensus
that biotechnological research ‘has helped the
creation of a new industrial sector and has enabled
a massive restructuring of the industrial organiza-
tion of target identiﬁcation and validation, drug
discovery and the very early stages of develop-
ment’ (Hopkins et al., 2007, p. 583). Similarly,
Nightingale (2000) observes that the pharmaceu-
tical industry is to an increasing degree dependent
on biotechnological innovations (i.e. in the form
of patents). Given that the underlying character-
istics and nature of the innovation process in that
industry has changed, cooperation with biotech-
nology ﬁrms can signiﬁcantly speed up drug
development in pharmaceutical ﬁrms (see Pisano,
2006a). However, considering that our research
covers the entire biotechnology population (and
not only those ﬁrms concentrating on drug
development) our results only partially contribute
to this ongoing debate.
Second, there might be some concerns regard-
ing our dependent construct, the patent rate.
Some recent research has pointed to the observa-
tion that patents only provide a limited regime of
appropriability for biotechnology ﬁrms, as phar-
maceutical ﬁrms appropriate a signiﬁcant share
of the value of the biotech innovation (see
Pisano, 2006a). This is due to a pharmaceutical
ﬁrm’s control over co-specialized assets to
produce the drug and bring the drug to market.
While we acknowledge this fact, we believe that
patents are of strategic value for a biotechnology
ﬁrm to secure a steady revenue stream, either in
the form of out-licensing innovation to the
pharmaceutical industry or from milestone
payments received in development agreements
(Gassmann and Keupp, 2007; Gassmann et al.,
2008, p. 35; Hopkins et al., 2007, p. 581).
However, considering that our research covers
the entire biotechnology population (and not
only biotechnology–pharma alliances aimed at
drug development) our results only partially
contribute to this ongoing debate.
We also believe that it would be valuable to
have a more reﬁned data set that would allow us
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– for example – to distinguish between diﬀerent
phases in the scientiﬁc discovery process. We
could then distinguish a biotechnology ﬁrm’s role
in basic research, applied research, product
development and testing, for example.
From a method point of view, our research
uses the diﬀerence in basic dominant logic
between public organizations and private rent-
seeking ﬁrms and basic diﬀerences in scientiﬁc
disciplines to measure relative absorptive capa-
city. Clearly, a more reﬁned approach would be
preferable. For example, pharmaceutical and
biochemical ﬁrms vary greatly in the number
and type of scientiﬁc disciplines involved in their
businesses. In addition, our measure of absorp-
tive capacity focused only upon the breadth of
knowledge domains. It is possible for example
that the prior patents held by a biotechnology
ﬁrm are also an indicator of absorptive capacity.
Our research suggests several implications for
future development. One area is the possible
moderating eﬀects of absorptive capacity on the
relationship between cooperative activities and
the generation of new, codiﬁable knowledge. Our
study suggests that only research relationships
enhance innovativeness and that research rela-
tionships with public organizations are more
eﬃcacious. However, it is possible that biotech-
nology ﬁrms with a high level of absorptive
capacity can utilize purchased knowledge to
generate innovation while ﬁrms with a lower
level of absorptive capacity cannot.
Another avenue would be to extend the
research to include the commercial outcomes
associated with the patents generated by biotech-
nology ﬁrms. The resource- and knowledge-
based theories of the ﬁrm are, at their foundation,
concerned with competitive advantage and the
generation of economic rents. By treating all
patents as equivalent, we may be missing
important economic outcomes associated with
diﬀerent patents. Extending our research to
include measures of, for example, success in
generating commercially viable products would
be an important contribution in future research.
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